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EQUITABLE CONVERSION IN WILLS IN
SOUTH CAROLINA
I. GENERALLY
A venerable application of the maxim that equity regards
as done that which ought to be done' is the doctrine of equitable
conversion whereby realty is regarded as personalty or, less
commonly, personalty as realty.2 The doctrine is ordinarily im-
portant in South Carolina only to determine inheritance," but is
also invoked where a deceased has contracted to purchase land
before death without taking a conveyance. 4 Here the contract
right passes to the heirs as realty in intestacy or to the devisee
in testacy.5
II. Cownsiox By WiL AND ITs EFFcTs
Where a testator directs his lands to be sold and bequeaths
the proceeds, the disposition is regarded in equity as one of
personalty. 6 An early reported fragment, PostelZ v. Postell's
E,'rs,7 indicates a clear following of the doctrine of equitable
conversion in South Carolina. The later case of -Wilkins V.
Talor8 sets out a clear exposition of the doctrine.
[T]he rule of Equity . . . is . . . that it is in the power
of a testator, at his option, to give to his property the char-
acter of real or personal estate. If money is directed general-
ly to be laid out in land, it will be regarded as land, and
go to the heir at law, or otherwise as directed by the will.9
1. See generally 2 PoMERoy, EQuITY JURISPRUDENCE §§ 364-71 (5th ed.
1941).
2. See generally 4 POMEROY, op. cit. m.pra note 1, §§ 1159-68.
3. Jeffords v. Thornal, 204 S.C. 257, 29 S.E.2d 116 (1944).
4. Wilkins v. Taylor, 8 Rich. Eq. 291 (S.C. 1847) (dictum).
5. In such a case the heir or devisee can compel the personal representa-
tive to pay the purchase price of the land contracted for before death. Lan-
drum v. Hatcher, 11 Rich. 54 (S.C. 1857). Compare Ford v. Gaithur, 2 Rich.
Eq. 270 (S.C. 1846) where land passed as intestate property subject to a mort-
gage given after the will was made; the court indicated that the heir could re-
quire reimbursement from the personal assets on foreclosure of the mortgage
(dictum). Where land is contracted to be sold after having been devised by
will, the contract converts the land into personalty and operates as a revoca-
tion of the devise. Pinson v. Pinson, 150 S.C. 368, 148 S.E. 211 (1929). In
such a case the heir or devisee holds only a bare legal title; the right to the
proceeds from the sale passes to the personal representative. 5 PAGE, WILLS
§46.1 (rev. ed. 1962).
6. 5 PAGE, op. cit. supra note 5, § 46.1.
7. 1 Desaus. Eq. 173 (S.C. 1790).
8. 8 Rich. Eq. 291 (S.C. 1847).
9. Id. at 295.
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. In the Wilkins case the testator had directed land sold and
the proceeds disposed of. Under the then-prevailing rule that a
will witnessed by the executor was void as to personalty but not
as to realty,10 the court invoked the doctrine to invalidate the
entire disposition. As a result complete intestacy occurred since
the testator was considered to have made a will of personalty by
virtue of the doctrine of equitable conversion. The widow and
children therefore took the property under tne rules of intestate
succession.
In Perry v. Logan"l the dissimilar consequences of a will of
personalty as opposed to a will of realty were of critical im-
portance also. Where the rule obtained that a limitation over
on failure of issue was effective as to personal property but not
as to real, the doctrine of conversion was applied to validate such
a limitation over since the estate property became personalty in
the view of equity.
[T]he distinction between personal and real estate in this
respect . . . is not . . . applicable to the case. In this Court,
according to the equitable doctrine of conversion, there was
no real estate to pass under the limitations of the will, al-
though there was real estate disposed of by it. The will gave
no land to the beneficiaries, but directed that the real, as
well as the personal estate should be sold by the executors:
and it was the "proceeds" of the sale that the testatrix gave,
to be equally divided among her seven grand children.
12
(Emphasis added.)
A. Clear Intent To Convert Required
Since equitable conversion is important in wills to give effect
to the testator's desires to treat one species of property as the
other, a clear intent to convert must be found.13 In the case of
Farmer v. Spell"4 the testator directed that his just debts be
paid and devised certain property to his son to be given at a
valuation, the daughter to have an equivalent value in personalty
out of the remaining property. The court held that land so given
was not to be regarded as converted into personalty since the
10. The executor is now a competent witnessing party although he forfeits
his commission by so doing. S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-260 (1962).
11. 5 Rich. Eq. 202 (S.C. 1853).
12. Id. at 215.
13. 18 C.J.S. Conversion § 16 (1938).
14. 11 Rich. Eq. 541 (S.C. 1860).
1965] NoT_ s
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valuation was taken only for the purposes of equality among
beneficiaries. The commonly found direction to pay debts gave
rise to no implication of conversion since that provision only
expressed what the law required. The estate's debts were con-
siderable, but under the rule that personalty is the primary fund
for the payment thereof, the lands devised were not affected:
no conversion was worked of them.
The more recent case of Cagle v. Shaefer"5 reaffirmed the
Farmer result: where land was given at a valuation, no infer-
ence arose that it was to be treated as money. Although a sale
of the property was authorized, the will required that the pro-
ceeds be reinvested in like property-a manifest purpose to make
a gift of land.
In a related case, Ex parte Johnson,1 8 it was again stated that
equitable conversion does not arise absent a clear intent that the
land given is to be treated as money. Thus, directions in a will
that a tract of land be divided equally among named benefici-
aries worked no conversion. 17
Although a clear intent to treat land as money, or vice versa,
must be found before the doctrine of conversion comes into play,
property may be converted not only by specific directions but
by implication,1 8 as in the case of Clarke v. Clarke.19 In this
case the testatrix directed payment of debts which combined
with the assorted legacies amounted to some sixty-five thousand
dollars. The fact that the decedent possessed personalty of value
less than one thousand dollars in South Carolina did not of it-
self give rise to an implied conversion of the considerable real
property for the satisfaction of the gifts and debts. However,
the court did find an implied conversion since the will blended
personalty and realty in the residuary clause20 and provided that
certain minors' shares held by another be paid over, speaking in
terms of whole sum, pay, etc. The use of the term devise-a term
of realty-was negated by the overriding tenor of the will in
terms of personalty. The Clarke court followed a dictum from
Farmer v. Spell suggesting conversion by implication.
15. 115 S.C. 35, 104 S.E. 321 (1920).
16. 147 S.C. 259, 145 S.E. 113 (1928).
17. Accord, McNamara v. Ayers, 191 S.C. 228, 196 S.E. 545 (1938).
18. 18 C.J.S. Conversion § 16 (1938).
19. 46 S.C. 230, 24 S.E. 202 (1896).
20. Accord, general rule. 18 C.J.S. Conversion § 16 (1938).
[Vol. 17
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NoTEs
[I]f the intention to dispose . . . as personalty can be as-
certained from the face of the will it may not be indispen-
sable that a sale should be explicitly directed as a means of
conversion. 21
B. Limited Conversion Where Purpose Fails
In North v. Valk22 the extent of the conversion effected where
the testator's purpose fails or succeeds with an intestate residue
was considered. The rule announced was that a so-called out and
out conversion, that is, a general direction to sell the realty, im-
pressed the property as personalty; however, if the land is to
be sold for a specific purpose which fails, as for example the
payment of debts of which there are none at death, no conver-
sion is worked. If the purpose of the sale is met and a surplus
remains undisposed of, the property passes as realty. If the
residue of the converted property is disposed of by the terms of
the will, it does not go as realty but is treated as personalty.
And if such a residue is to go to legatees who take as tenants
in common with no survivorship between them and one of the
residuary legatees dies during the testator's lifetime, his share
devolves to the distributee for the evident reason that the gift
has lapsed.
23
C. Conversion As To Debts And Abatement
In McFadden v. Hefley24 it was held that the doctrine of
conversion would not be given effect for all purposes, as for
example, to defeat the payments of debts out of the personalty
or assent by the executor to the beneficiaries' taking.26 The will
in the case provided that "To my daughter . . . I give and be-
queath $400.00 to be invested by my executors in a home-
stead .... Y2 6 Clearly an intention to make a gift of land rather
than money, the provision was not allowed to override the liabili-
ties of personalty under the guise of equitable real estate. Thus
the fund which the testator had elected to treat as land was
treated as no different from the other personal assets of the
21. Supra note 14, at 548.
22. 1 Dud. Eq. 212 (S.C. 1838).
23. Accord, general rule. 18 CJ.S. Conversion § 24 (1938).
24. 28 S.C. 317, 5 S.E. 812 (1887).
25. Accord, general rule. 18 CJ.S. Conversion § 26 (1938).
26. 28 S.C. 317, 318, 5 S.E. 812, 813 (1887).
1965]
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estate and was subjected to the payment of debts as other per-
sonalty under the order of abatement.
[W]here . . .'a pecuniary legacy is given, and the same is
directed to be laid out in land . . ., for some purposes . .. ,
such a testamentary provision may be regarded as a devise
of real estate, yet it cannot be so regarded for all purposes,
and . . . the assent of the executor is necessary to perfect
title of the legatee; and . . . until such assent, the legacy
constitutes a part of the personal assets of the testator, and
as such must be applied, as the other personal estate, to the
payment of debts.
27
D. Conversion As Regards The Nature Of The Estate Or Gift
As has been seen in Pe-ry v. Logan,28 where a gift over was
effective as to personalty but not as to real estate, the limitation
was good under the rule of conversion of the land into money
by directions in the will. Another varying consequence between
gifts of realty and personalty appeared in the cases of Renwicek
v. Smith," Dunlap v. Garlington,3 0 and Andrews v. Loeb,31
where a fee conditional attached to gifts of the proceeds of land
directed to be sold operated to give absolute ownership to the
several legatees. Although in the Andrews case the legatee elected
to take the land rather than the proceeds, thus effecting equitable
reconversion, 2 the result was the same, viz., the condition at-
tached to the gift was inoperative under the rule that a fee con-
ditional gift of personal property vests an absolute estate.
What she took under the will, therefore, was personalty,
and the words added to the will which would have given
only a fee conditional in the land, gave her an absolute
estate in personalty, i.e., in the proceeds of the land. The
subsequent election to take the land instead of the money,
operates to give her a good title in fee to the land.33
27. Id. at 322, 5 S.E. at 815.
28. Supra note 11.
29. 11 S.C. 294 (1877).
30. 17 S.C. 567 (1882).
31. 22 S.C. 274 (1884).
32. See discussion infra.
33. 22 S.C. 274, 275 (1884).
[Vol. 1-7
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E. Reconversion
As the term implies, equitable reconversion occurs where those
beneficiaries who for the purposes of the will are regarded as
taking realty as personalty or vice versa elect to take the prop-
erty in its original species rather than in its converted form.
4
In Mattison v. Stone35 it was said that reconversion is effected
where the beneficiaries of proceeds of sale unequivocally elect
instead to take the land.3 6
F. Power As Opposed To Direction To Bell
It is generally held that a mere power to sell devised or intes-
tate property effects no conversion at the testator's death. How-
ever, when such an optional power is in fact exercised the prop-
perty is regarded as converted from that time.37 South Carolina
appears to have no decision on the point but certainly would
follow the general rule. It was held in Ware v. Murph,88 citing
and following Ferguson v. King,3 9 where land was left under
an unexercised power of sale in the executor that title to the fee
vested in the heirs. By implication of the Ware decision that title
to land under a power of sale was in the heirs rather than the
personal representative, no conversion is worked in such a case
in South Carolina.
G. Effect Of Discretion In Executor
In Bell v. BelZ40 it was argued that no conversion was worked
of realty directed to be sold since the executor was given discre-
tion as to the manner and time of sale, the net proceeds to be
divided among certain named beneficiaries. However the court
held that since the direction to sell was absolute-the discretion
going only to the manner of making the sale-the testator pal-
pably intended to treat the property disposed of as personalty.4 1
34. 18 C.J.S. Conversion § 52 (1938).
35. 90 S.C. 146, 72 S.E. 991 (1911).
36. The conditions under which takers of proceeds may reconvert the fund
and take the land itself are considered infra.
37. 5 PAGE, op. cit. supra note 5, § 46.3.
38. 1 Rice 54 (S.C. 1838).
39. 2 Nott & McCord 588 (S.C. 1820).
40. 25 S.C. 149 (1886).
41. Accord, general rule. 18 C.J.S. Conversion §20 (1938). Note in the
Bell case the implicit following of the rule as to power to sell as opposed to
direction. See discussion snpra. Had the executor's discretion concerned
whether or not to sell, presumably no conversion would have arisen.
1965] NOTES
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Conversion is also worked where the time of sale is postponed
or is remote,42 as was stated in Farr v. Gilreath.48 "The general
rule is, that where the conversion is imperatively directed, it is
regarded as taking place at the testator's death, although the
time fixed by him for the sale for that purpose be distant."44
In Byrne's Ad'mrs v. Stewart's Adm 'rs 45 lands directed to be
sold on an infant's coming of age were held equitably converted.
"The sale is suspended but the ultimate destination is to make the
bequest pecuniary. '46 Likewise in Colton v. Galbraith,4 7 where
lands were directed to be sold at a widow's death and the pro-
ceeds distributed, etc., the disposition was regarded as one of
personalty.
H. Rights And Powers Of Affected Parties
In Walker v. Killian48 it was held that the beneficiaries of
property converted to personalty by directions to sell in the will
do not get title to the fee but rather a simple personal estate.49
Thus an attempted mortgage of the land by the beneficiaries
was ineffective as such, operating only as an assignment of the
proceeds enforceable in equity. It was also noted that the right
to the proceeds was not a lien superior to the expenses of the
administration of the estate.
Similarly, the beneficiaries of converted realty could not main-
tain an action for partition of the land in the case of Burton V.
Burton.50 The court pointed out however that the beneficiaries
of the proceeds could require the executors to sell the realty
and divide the proceeds, including payment for past rents and
profits.
In Bell v. BelZ5 1 it was held that since the takers of the pro-
ceeds of a directed sale have only an interest in personalty, such
legatees could not assail a judgment against the land to be sold.
Mattison v. Stone 2 held that one who had a remainder interest
42. 18 C.J.S. Conversion. § 23 (1938).
43. 23 S.C. 502 (1885).
44. Id. at 513.
45. 3 Desaus. Eq. 135 (S.C. 1810).
46. Id. at 143.
47. 35 S.C. 531, 14 S.E. 957 (1891).
48. 62 S.C. 482, 40 S.E. 887 (1902).
49. 18 C.J.S. Conversion § 39 (1938).
50. 113 S.C. 227, 102 S.E. 282 (1920).
51. Supra note 40.
52. Supra note 35.
[Vol. 1-7
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in the proceeds of a directed sale could not cause a partition of
the lands affected unless the proceeds of the sale had been fore-
gone and the land itself taken by reconversion. But in the
second Mattison v. Stone5 3 holding it was stated that the holders
of a life estate interest in proceeds could not elect to reconvert
where the will provided for a remainder interest in the proceeds.
Nevertheless, one who sought partition of the land wrongfully
reconverted and conveyed to a third party could not prove the
necessary title to the land for the purpose of partition since
under the will he had an interest only in proceeds, not the fee.
The court intimated that the contingent remainderman should
pursue an interest in the proceeds before the instant action.
In Farr v. GilreathA14 a will left property in trust" and pro-
vided that if the cestui que should die without issue, the pro-
perty was to be sold by the trustee and the proceeds distributed.
At the cestui que's request part of the property was sold for
support. The contingent remainderman brought an action to
recover the land from the purchaser. The court recognized the
propriety of the accelerated sale as consonant with the testator's
intent and held that since the remainder interest was a legacy
rather than a devise, the beneficiaries were remitted to the pro-
ceeds of the sale.
The case of Hamer v. Bethea56 involved joint owners of land,
one of whom had died intestate. The lower court had decreed
the lands sold and the proceeds distributed to the deceased's
heirs upon application for partition by the surviving owner. In
another action by the heirs against the administrator to whom
the funds had been paid instead, the court held that there was
no conversion of the realty as to the administrator's powers. The
extent of his capacity depended upon the character impressed
on the property at death. Although the partition order extin-
guished the heirs' title to the land and gave them an interest
53. 99 S.C. 151, 82 S.E. 1046 (1914).
54. Sipra note 43.
55. Real property is converted where left in trust to be sold, the trustee
being under a duty to hold or distribute the proceeds; similarly, personal
property left in trust to be expended for land is regarded as giving the cestui
que an interest in realty. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS § 131 (1) (2).
In addition to Farr v. Gilreath. 23 S.C. 502 (1885), the cases of Clarke v.
Clarke, 46 S.C. 230, 24 S.E. 202 (1896), Land Title & Trust Co. v. South
Carolina Tax Comm'n, 131 S.C. 192, 126 S.E. 189 (1924), and Newberry
v. Walker, 162 S.C. 478, 161 S.E. 100 (1931) (discussed under topics infra)
applied the doctrine of equitable conversion where property was left to a
trustee to be sold and the proceeds distributed.
56. 11 S.C. 416 (1878).
NoTs1965]
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in the proceeds, the administrator had no power to receive or
dispose of the fund since the duties of the office are confined
to what is personalty at death.
In O'Neale v. Dunlap5 7 certain devised property of wards was
sold by the guardian who invested the proceeds plus other funds
in other land. Where the wards elected to take the purchased
property, the court held that it passed as realty to their heirs
and not as so much real estate plus so much personalty as repre-
senting the origin of the invested funds.
In Newberry v. lWalker5 a it was held that certain unborn
children who were to take an interest in the proceeds of land
directed to be sold could never acquire legal title to the realty
but only an equitable interest in the fund upon birth.
In American Bible Society v. Noble,59 where lands were direct-
ed to be sold and the proceeds distributed, the doctrine was in-
voked to validate a gift of the fund to a religious corporation
although a direct devise of the land itself was forbidden by
statute. 0
In Dickson v. Davis0 ' it was held that no right of dower at-
tached where a wife's spouse was the beneficiary of a gift of
proceeds from the sale of land, the bequest being one of per-
sonalty in the view of Equity.
L Elquitable Retainer Out Of Converted Funds
The cases of Smith v. Huger62 and In re Covin's Estate,6
where lands directed to be sold were regarded as personalty, al-
lowed the equitable retention of debts due the estate by certain
legatees. Had the doctrine of conversion not been invoked to
make the gift one of personalty, no set off would have been per-
mitted under the rule that land specifically devised or such is
exempt-as was held in ZcNamara v. Ayers 4 where no conver-
sion of the land was worked by mere directions to divide it.
57. 11 Rich. Eq. 405 (S.C. 1860).
58. 162 S.C. 478, 161 S.E. 100 (1931).
59. 11 Rich. Eq. 156 (S.C. 1859).
60. Accord, general rule. 18 CJ.S. Conversion §40 (1938).
61. 31 F. Supp. 912 (W.D.S.C. 1940).
62. 1 Desaus. Eq. 247 (S.C. 1791).
63. 20 S.C. 471 (1883).
64. 191 S.C. 228, 196 S.E. 545 (1938) (discussed supra).
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III. CoNvEnsioN OF OuT OF STATE REALTY
In Clarke v. Clarke65 the United States Supreme Court held
that the decision of the South Carolina court in Clarke v.
Clarke6" as regards equitable conversion of realty into person-
alty did not bind other jurisdictions under the full faith and
credit clause of the federal constitution. The Court held that
the decision of the domicilliary tribunal that the will converted
out of state realty did not foreclose the foreign court's con-
sideration but that the state where the land was located had
exclusive province in the matter.
In Land Title & Trust Co. v. South Carolina Tax ComM'n 7
the question of the domicilliary state's power to tax out of state
realty was considered. The testatrix, domiciled in South Caro-
lina, directed that certain real and personal property located in
Philadelphia be sold and the proceeds distributed, thus con-
verting the whole into personalty. The South Carolina tax was
assessed on the theory that the conversion of the land into per-
sonalty made it includible as a portion of a legacy left by a
resident and thus subject to the state inheritance tax. The South
Carolina court reasoned that if beneficiaries under a will could
invoke the doctrine of equitable conversion, the tax commission
could likewise rely on the rule. Citing the United States ClarkeG8
case for the proposition that the state tax commission must
abide by the rules of equitable conversion as set forth by the
law of the jurisdiction where the land is located, the South
Carolina court concluded that the situs state, Pennsylvania, fol-
lowed the doctrine of equitable conversion for the purpose of
allowing a tax on the converted realty regarded as part of the
general legacy. Therefore the court held that the domiciliary
state could likewise assess a legacy tax on the property. The
general basis of the taxing power was the rule that personalty
was deemed to be located in the domicilliary state and thus sub-
ject to its laws, while the laws of the situs governed the passage
of realty.
A decision of the Supreme Court a year later undermined the
basis of the Land Title & Trust Co. case. It was held in Frick v.
Pennsylvania"! that the domicilliary state may not assess an
65. 178 U.S. 186 (1900).
66. 46 S.C. 230, 24 S.E. 202 (1896).
67. 131 S.C. 192, 126 S.E. 189 (1924).
68. Supra note 65.
69. 268 U.S. 473 (1925).
19651 NoT s
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inheritance tax on out of state personalty owned by a resident at
death.
The Frick case having denied the power of the domicil to
exact the tax in respect of tangible personal property de-
finitely located in another state, it is difficult to see how the
principle of equitable conversion can any longer be applied
for the purpose of exacting the tax at the domicil, in respect
of real property located in another state equitably converted
by the willJ.
7 0
Although the interstate arm of the tax commission to reach out
of state bequests of foreign personalty may no longer be em-
ployed, the commission's power to assess tax on the passage of
state realty considered as equitably converted remains unaffected
under the Land Title & Trust Co. reasoning.
IV. CoNCL ION
The doctrine of equitable conversion has maintained its vitality
throughout the history of the South Carolina courts. If it is
conjectured that the doctrine's less frequent appearance in the
recent past bespeaks its demise, one only need remember that
rules of law eventually become so well settled that to reaffirm
them is needless. For this reason the applicable provision of
the proposed probate code71 seems almost like an intruder in the
house of case law. Although the occasions for the employment
of the doctrine of equitable conversion arise less often where
the distinctions between the passage of intestate real and per-
sonal property are abolished,7 2 there remains a broad area for
its use wherever the distinctions between realty and personalty
are material in giving effect to the provisions of wills.
PAUIL R. HIBAPW
70. Annot., 42 A.L.R. 347 (1926).
71. "A testamentary direction to sell real property, and the exercise of a
testamentary power of sale of real property, shall constitute an equitable
conversion of real estate into personal property but shall not affect
distribution of the estate under the provisions of the will."
Proposed Probate Code § 89(c). Note that the language fails to provide for
reconversion and applies the doctrine where property is sold under a power
(see discussion supra).
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